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The introduction and transfer of modern science and technology is one of the most 
important factors in modern intellectual history in Japan and China. A 
comparison of this process in the two nations provides striking results. In this 
paper, the expression intellectual isolation will be used. for negative attitudes and 
intellectual opening for positive attitudes concerning the introduction of Western or 
modern science and technology into a country. Just after Japan abandoned its 
intellectual isolation policy, which had been practiced for over ninety years, China 
entered a period of intellectual isolation for one hundred and twenty years. 
Different measures against Western impacts after the Opium War, and the 
bifurcation of modernization in Japan and China, thereafter, originated in this 
reversal of intellectual isolation and opening of these two nations. This paper will 
focus on the meaning of this reversal. 
    Just after his enthronement in 1723, Emperor Yong Zheng Di prohibited 
Christian missionary work and banished all missionaries from China, apart from 
those who were members of the national observatory. It is symbolic that in the 
same year, two scientific works by Chinese scientists, the Li Xiang Kao Cheng and 
Li Suan Quan Shu, were published. Li Xian Kao Cheng was compiled by Chinese 
scientists based on a series of astronomical books introduced by Jesuits at the end 
on the Ming dynasty. This shows that some Chinese scientists had mastered 
Western astronomy rooted in the world system of Tycho Brahe. Li Suan Quan Shu, 
by Mei Wen Ding, is one of the best achievements in an endeavor to integrate 
Western science with traditional science. It could be called a masterpiece of hybrid 
science. Hybridization in science and technology spells a sure way for a country to 
assimilate alien science and technology with indigenous science and technology. 
Li Xiang Kao Cheng Ho Pian was later compiled by a Jesuit employed at the 
astronomical observatory. Published in 1742, this book demonstrates historical 
significance beyond that of Li Xiang Kao Cheng, for it introduces Kepler's method 
of calendar making. This was also the last scientific volume compiled by a Jesuit 
in China. On the other hand, knowledge of Galilean mechanics and the telescope 
had already been accepted, to some extent, in China in the previous century. To
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sum up, prior to intellectual isolation, the Chinese had been accepting Western 
science from ancient times to the middle ages, as well as modern science up to 
Galileo-Keplerian times via the Jesuits. 
     In Japan, Shogun Tokugawa Yoshimune removed a ban on importing 
Western books translated into Chinese, excluding Christian writings, in 1720. 
Obviously, the major reason behind this change in policy was a desire to import 
books on science and technology. 
     After this intellectual opening, the Japanese first conducted research in 
Western and modern science already accepted by the Chinese. One of the first to 
challenge this area of unknown intellectual inquiry was Takebe Katahiro. He 
started to translate Li Suan Quan Shu, previously referred to as a masterpiece of 
hybrid science, at the order of the Bakufu (government) in 1726. It is worth noting 
that Takebe was a mathematician and also an excellent researcher of the Shou Shi 
calendar, which was considered to be the best product to come from Chinese 
astronomy. Japanese astronomers subsequently went on to study Li Xiang Kao 
Cheng. Asada Goryu and his disciples obtained calendar making methods from Li 
Xiang Kao Cheng in the 1780's. Furthermore, Takahashi Yoshitoki, one of Asada's 
disciples, mastered Kepler's method of calculation in Li Xiang Kao Cheng Hou Pian 
by 1802. In the following year, he wrote an abridged translation and notes of the 
Dutch version of Traite d'Astronomy (1764) by a leading French astronomer, J. J .F. 
Lalande. This showed Takahashi's understanding of Kepler's law of planetary 
motion and the Newtonian world system. This was merely forty years after the 
original publication of Lalande's book, suggesting that leading scientists in Japan 
caught up with contemporary modern science in the early nineteenth century 
within a period of forty years. 
     From 1720, the Bakufu attempted to acquire knowledge on science and 
technology directly from the Dutch in Nagasaki. The Bakufu appointed a few 
academics to learn Dutch and ordered them to study Dutch books in 1740. Under 
this new policy which effectively increased interest in Western science, those who 
particularly acquired knowledge via Dutch studies were medical doctors. Their 
work resulted in the publication of the first translation of a Dutch science book, 
Kaitaishinsho (New Book of Anatomy) in 1774. 
     The development of Dutch studies thereafter was exceedingly rapid, and 
interest in Dutch studies spread out into the intellectual world in both cities and 
rural areas. The arrival of P. F. von Siebold, a German doctor and scientist who 
was sent by the Dutch East Asian Company to Japan, gave further impetus to the 
promotion of Dutch studies. It is recorded that he taught fifty-seven intellectuals 
as students at his private school, and had forty-five intellectuals as friends. Dutch 
scholars began to open their own private schools in Japan, the most famous being
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Ogata KOan's school, founded in Osaka in 1838. Many of the graduates were to 
become leading figures during the Meiji restoration. This was the situation of the 
intellectual opening in Japan just before the Opium War. 
     With the Opium War erupting in 1840, Chinese knowledge of modern 
sciences was to advance no further than the Galileo-Keplerian stages, while 
Japanese scientists engaged in commerce as a means to further pursue nineteenth 
century science. This difference was not confirmed to scientific knowledge. Prior 
to the Opium War, a group of Dutch scholars embarked on a criticism of the 
foreign policy of the Bakufu, also claiming that the Bakufu had to be suppressed. 
Dutch studies in Japan provided the soil for cultivating scope and discernment 
necessary for leaders and rising generations to understand the present state of 
Japan in the global situation, and to deal with politico-military matters. 
     The Opium War in 1840 broke down China's intellectual isolation but it 
was Japan, rather than China, which immediately reacted, via actions, to the 
impact of this war. A few intellectuals, like Wei Yuan, sounded the alarm for the 
Chinese, but their appeals met with no response. In contrast, the Bakufu in Japan 
started, without any delay, to take measures against Western military aggression 
in 1841. The domains of Saga, Satsuma and others supported and followed the 
Bakufu from the beginning of the 1850's. Smelting works built for arms 
production in Saga in 1850 and in Satsuma in 1851, marked the beginning of a 
move towards enhancing the wealth and military strength of the nation of Japan. 
The Yang Wu movement, or the movement to promote the wealth and military 
strength of the nation in China, commenced in 1861 after the Second Opium War 
which finally woke up Chinese intellectuals and high officials. This time lag of ten 
years between Japan and China for the beginning of such movements was due to 
each nation's different experiences since the 1720's, and this had a symbolic 
meaning for modernization processes as well. 
     The subsequent courses of the introduction and transfer of science and 
technology, however, bear a surprising resemblance in Japan and China. 
Although there was a time lag of about ten years on average between these two 
countries, both the Japanese and Chinese recognized the Western impact as a 
menace of military strength, and therefore, promoted, first of all, measures to 
strengthen their own nations. By and by, however, Japan and China recognized 
the necessity of enriching their own respective countries in order to found a nation 
with a strong armament. The above mentioned close resemblance in the pattern of 
development between Japan and China was produced by the same dynamics 
involved in the inevitable shift of policy from overriding armament to a move 
towards promoting the wealth and armament of the country.
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     A comparison of Japan and China is as follows. Arsenals were founded at 
Saga and Satsuma, begun in 1850 and 1851, respectively, and in 1862 in Anquig 
and Shanghai. The construction of a steamboat took place at Satsuma in 1855, and 
in 1864 in Hanzhou. A naval academy was established at Nagasaki in 1855, at 
Fuzhou in 1867. A shipyard was founded at Nagasaki in 1857, Shanghai in 1865 
and at Fuzhou in 1866. Students were sent to Europe by the Bakufu and some 
domains in 1862, while the Qing dynasty started to send students to the United 
States in 1872. A spinning mill was established in Satsuma in 1867, in Lanzhou in 
1880. The Kei-hin rail line was inaugurated in 1872, and the Jing-Jin rail line in 
1881. Many other cases could be mentioned. 
     The resemblance of the two countries was never confined to exterior 
matters, but often extended to the details of transferred technology. For instance, 
the shipyards founded in Yokosuka in 1865 and in Fuzhou in 1866 are typical 
cases of successful transfers of technology. They were both based on French 
technology, possessed approximately the same kind and scale of factories, and 
employed about the same number of foreign engineers and technicians as 
instructors and native engineers, technicians and workers. They both built about 
the same quantity of warships and a few merchant vessels by 1910, until the Meiji 
era and the Qing dynasty ended. 
     In spite of these notable resemblances, differences between Japan and 
China cannot be overlooked. For one, Japan started to try to hybridize Japanese 
traditional technology and Western second-rate technology, after an unsuccessful 
transplantation of the most advanced technology from the West. Japanese 
industrialization, therefore, really started with the formation of hybrid technology. 
Also, Japanese political leaders had a strong will to reform the ancient regime and 
push forward the modernization of the country by selectively adopting Western 
institutions. One can easily recall the sharp contrast between the success of the 
Japanese Meiji Restoration in 1868 and the setback of the Chinese reform 
movement in 1898. This reflects different experiences between the two countries 
from the 1720's, and this is cogently expressed in the time lag of ten years at the 
introduction of technology. 
     The time lag of ten years symbolizes the reversal of intellectual opening 
and isolation in Japan and China. The precedence of ten years implies the might 
of knowledge and the flexibility of Japanese political institutions. Even though 
both nations followed similar courses, why did Japan's modernization differ so 
much from what China accomplished? One of the answers to this question lies, 
without any doubt, in the reversal experience of intellectual opening and isolation.
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     Finally, the importance of comparative studies concerning the history of 
science and technology in Asian countries should be emphasized. I am convinced 
that such studies will uncover many new discoveries.
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